shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet

808 F. Instead, the General Assembly enacted a revised redistricting plan, 1991 N. C. Extra Sess. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. 364 U. S., at 341. They did not even claim to be white. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose V s. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. If a reapportionment plan creates a district that is so irregular that the only reason for its creation is to separate voters based on race, then an Equal Protection challenge against that plan is valid. The "historic and present condition" of the Mexican-American community, id., at 767, a status of cultural and economic marginality, id., at 768, as well as the legislature's unresponsiveness to the group's interests, id., at 768-769, justified the conclusion that MexicanAmericans were "'effectively removed from the political processes,'" and "invidiously excluded from effective participation in political life," id., at 769. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. Thus, "an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." See 478 U. S., at 131, n. 12 (plurality opinion). The state appellees suggest that a covered jurisdiction may have a compelling interest in creating majority-minority. ); id., at 518 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 280282 (plurality opinion); id., at 286 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Centered in the northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina border. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. See ante, at 649. We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. U. S. See, e. g., Croson, supra, at 509 (plurality opinion). Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly's plan. e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Id., at 133 (emphasis added). See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." Supp., at 467. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Id., at 56-58. Wright involved a challenge to a legislative plan that created four districts. The U.S. Supreme Court and the federal government should encourage states to find ways to comply with the act, even if compliance results in oddly shaped districts, the attorney argued. Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips, and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 Yale L. J. But their loose and imprecise use by today's majority has, I fear, led it astray. Dissenting Opinion (Harlan):. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." 808 F. Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 422 (1977); the "stacking" of "a large minority population concentration with a larger white population," Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution 85, 92 (C. Davidson ed. argument that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when the lines drawn favor the minority, since equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification, Richmond v. J. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra-. 430 U. S., at 165. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. The General Assembly's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). Because Gingles involved North Carolina, which the Court admits has earlier established the existence of "pervasive racial bloc voting," ante, at 656, its citizens and legislators-as well as those from other States-will no doubt be confused by the Court's requirement of evidence in one type of case that the Constitution now prevents reliance on in another. I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen inKarcher v. Daggett(1983),Gomillion v. Lightfoot)(1960), and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. (equating various articulations of standards of review "more stringent" than "'reasonableness'" with "strict scrutiny"). These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. upon an extraordinary justification. As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. That claim was dismissed, see Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. I respectfully dissent. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. See Fed. Because of previous acts of racial discrimination, North Carolina fell under the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which mandated that any redistricting plan adopted by the state legislature be submitted to the U.S. Justice Department or the District Court for the District of Columbia for approval. As we have held, one's constitutional rights are not violated merely because the candidate one supports loses the election or because a group (including a racial group) to which one belongs winds up with a representative from outside that group. Supp., at 472-473. It was a function of the type of injury upon which the Court insisted. the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. The court ruled in a 5-4 decision that redistricting based on race must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. have insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process.1 Although this severe burden has limited the number of successful suits, it was adopted for sound reasons. With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." To help you find the subject, ask, Who answered? Gaffney v. Cummings, 412. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. 364 U. S., at 341. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). ); post, at 684, and n. 6 (opinion of SOUTER, J. I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. Appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Marc D. Stern and Lois C. Waldman; for the Republican National Committee by Benjamin L. Ginsberg and Michael A. Hess; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). Nor is there any support for the. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them in the other three.

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